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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

DAVID CALDERON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

District Court Case No. 071901957
071902173
Appellate Court No. 20080743-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated August 4, 2008.
Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4- 103(e).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA?

PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 032), and
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 60/2-11).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State
v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993).

The Court applies "the clearly

erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction
with that decision."

State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999).

"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvemtto, 983 P.2d
556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah
1996)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated
§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest.
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(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, PostConviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
78A-4-103, Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 11. Pleas.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and

(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. These
findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In case number 071902173, the Defendant was charged with Arson, a
third degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony.

In case number

071901957, the Defendant was charged with Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, a
second degree felony; Driving on a Suspended License, a class C misdemeanor
and Failure to Yield, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 071902173, the
Defendant pled guilty to both charges.

In case number 071901957, the

Defendant pled guilty to the second degree felony charge of Receiving a Stolen
Vehicle, and the State dismissed the two class C misdemeanors. The State also
agreed to not file additional charges against the Defendant. (R. 62/2-4).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 26, 2008, the Defendant entered into a plea agreement with
the State. As part of the agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to Arson, a third
degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony; and Receiving a Stolen Vehicle,
a second degree felony. Two class C misdemeanor traffic offenses and a class
B misdemeanor charge of theft were dismissed, and the State agreed to not file
4

four additional second degree felonies and one third degree felony. (R. 62/24).

Defendant entered Alford pleas where the Defendant did not admit guilt.
Defendant's attorney filled out a Rule 11 plea affidavit that Defendant

signed. This plea affidavit listed the elements of the crime, but did not give a
factual basis for the plea. In the section where the factual basis is to be listed,
Defendant's attorney wrote "same as above." (R. 64-70).
The prosecutor gave the judge a factual basis. This oral factual basis
was stated as follows:

"[T]he defendant was in - possession of the 1997

Honda Accord which had been reported stolen by Foster Auto.

He was

arrested for that charge and the automobile was impounded to All Hours
Towing since the Defendant was arrested while he was driving it.
Later that day or into the night the Defendant made bail, went over with
the assistance of some other people, got into All Hours Towing impound yard,
drove the car through a fence, took it out in a field and burned it." (R. 62/4).
On the second case, the prosecutor gave the following factual basis. "[T]he
defendant was stopped in an automobile that was stolen. He gave two or three
different stories that - as to where he got the car and also gave the officers a
registration to a different Honda than the one that he was driving - these were
all Hondas—than the one that he was driving." (R. 62/4).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant entered pled guilty to multiple felony charges without
admitting that he was guilty.

He entered what is commonly referred to as

Alford pleas. When a defendant enters an Alford plea, the trial court is required
to take a factual statement that either shows that the Defendant is guilty or that
he faces a substantial risk of conviction if he were to go to trial.

This

requirement is grounded in constitutional due process and is necessary to
insure that the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.
The factual basis in Defendant's case did not meet the Rule 11 or the
Constitution's due process requirements.

The prosecutor simply made

conclusory remarks that did not contain all of the elements of the charges
against the Defendant. Furthermore, the plea statement that was filled out by
Defendant's attorney failed to list a factual basis for the pleas. Since there was
an insufficient factual basis put into the record Defendant's plea was not
knowing and voluntarily entered. Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA.

6

Under Utah law, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
U.C.A. §77-13-6 (2008). Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs the taking of a guilty plea. Strict compliance with Rule 11 is not
required; however, compliance with Rule 11 creates a presumption that the
plea was knowing and voluntary. See, State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, % 22.
There are times where a defendant enters a plea of guilty even though
the defendant refuses to admit guilt. These pleas are Constitutionally accepted
and are entered pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision of North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
When an Alford plea is entered, the trial court must find, on the record,
that there is a sufficient factual basis to accept the guilty plea when the
defendant does not admit guilt. "[T]he record must reveal either facts that
would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would
suggest a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial." State v.
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Establishing a factual basis
when a defendant enters an Alford plea is necessary to ensure that the plea is
knowing and voluntary. "Furthermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the
defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the
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relationship of the law to the facts." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312
(Utah 1987).
The trial court must also find that a sufficient factual basis exists that
causes the defendant to face a substantial risk of conviction at trial. "The pleataking proceedings are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty
knowingly and voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees
him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v. Stilling, at 671.
In the case at bar, the Defendant entered an Alford plea. See, (R. 62/512). When a defendant enters an Alford plea a stronger factual basis is required
to be placed on the record than when a regular guilty plea is entered.
"Implementation of these requirements for accepting a guilty plea vary
somewhat when the defendant enters an Alford plea, whereby he or she is
sentenced without admitting guilt. In those cases the record must demonstrate
that there is evidence of the defendant's actual guilt." State v. Stilling at 671.
The heightened factual basis for an Alford plea "is grounded in constitutional
due process. . . ." Id. at 673.
In State v. Stilling, this Court examined a number of federal and state
court decisions. This Court held that when an Alford plea is entered and the
defendant doesn't admit to all of the elements of the charged crimes, "the
record must be sufficient to satisfy the trial court and/or a reviewing court that
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the State's case is strong enough to warrant acceptance of the plea when guilt is
not admitted by the defendant." Id. at 674.
This Court also stated that "[w]hile the record as a whole need not be
conclusive or incontroverted on the question of guilt, 'there must be evidence
from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty-a
factual basis for the plea.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514,
1517 (11th Cir. 1988).
In the case at bar, there was insufficient evidence presented to the trial
court that would establish that the Defendant was guilty of the crimes charged
or that there was a substantial risk that he would be convicted if he went to
trial. There was a plea affidavit that was filled out and put into the record as
well as a plea colloquy that took place. Each of these will be examined
separately.
A, The plea affidavit was insufficient
Appellate courts are able to look at the entire record when determining if
there was a sufficient factual basis. 'The record we examine to determine the
presence of a factual basis for Stilling's plea consists of the entire record before
us on appeal, which includes all portions of the trial court record certified on
appeal." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674.

9

In the case at bar, the Defendant's attorney filled out a "Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel." (R. 64-70)
This type of document is accepted and encouraged when a trial court takes a
guilty plea. However, there are several requirements that must be met when a
plea affidavit is used. "The affidavit should contain both a statement of the
elements of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish
the elements of the crimes charged." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313
(Utah 1987).
There was a statement in support of guilty plea that was prepared. (R.
64-70) Defendant read and signed this document. However, this document was
deficient in establishing a factual basis. The statement was a standard Rule 11
form used by the Weber County Public Defender's Office. There is an element
section that was filled out. There were no specific facts listed in the element
section. Below the element section is a factual section. The document states
"These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest)
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest):" Defendant's attorney wrote in this section "Same as Above."
This statement did not list a factual basis anywhere in the document.
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B. The oral factual basis was insufficient.
Prior to the Defendant entering the pleas, the prosecutor gave the court a
factual basis. He stated "the defendant was in - possession of the 1997 Honda
Accord which had been reported stolen by Foster Auto. He was arrested for
that charge and the automobile was impounded to All Hours Towing since the
defendant was arrested while he was driving it.
Later that day or into the night the Defendant made bail, went over with
the assistance of some other people, got into All Hours Towing impound yard,
drove the car through a fence, took it out in a field and burned it." (R. 62/4).
This factual basis covered two of the charges the Defendant pled guilty
to, theft and arson.

The prosecutor made a conclusory statement that

Defendant had committed these offenses. There were no facts presented "from
which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty. . ." Stilling,
856 P.2d at 674. Although the prosecutor indicated that Defendant was found
driving a vehicle that was reported to be stolen, there was no evidence
presented concerning one of the crucial elements, the Defendant's mental state.
Furthermore, there were no facts presented as to why the State believed that the
Defendant with some "other people" took the car from All Hours towing and
burned it.
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On the second case, the prosecutor gave the following factual basis.
"[tjhe defendant was stopped in an automobile that was stolen. He gave two or
three different stories that - as to where he got the car and also gave the
officers a registration to a different Honda than the one that he was driving these were all Hondas—than the one that he was driving." (R. 62/4). This was
another conclusory statement that that covered most of the elements of the
offense but failed to give any facts that would show the Defendant had a
substantial risk of a conviction if he went to trial.
In State v. Stilling, this Court stated that "[i]n the more usual Rule 11
guilty plea situation, the factual basis requirement insures that a defendant
understands the strength of the State's case and admits to each element of the
charged crime." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674. In Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d
860 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court applied a substantial compliance test
to a factual basis that was placed on the record. The Court stated that u[i]n the
entire record, nothing supports a finding that an adequate factual basis existed
at the time Willett entered his plea. The State has not adverted to any facts
regarding the events themselves that could form the basis of a conviction. The
closest anything in the record comes to establishing a factual basis is a brief
colloquy. . ." Id. at 861.
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The colloquy was given in the co-defendant's case. In that case, the
defendant's son and co-defendant stated that he aided and abetted his father in
the commission of killing the victim. Id. at 861-62. The Supreme Court found
that this statement was "merely a legal conclusion, parroting the statutory
elements of the crime charged against him." Id. at 862. The Supreme Court
found that this did not constitute a valid factual basis and reversed the district
court's ruling that there was a sufficient factual basis. Id.
Similarly, in the case at bar, there were only legal and factual
conclusions that were put in the record. Rule 11 (e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states that a factual basis is sufficient "if it establishes that
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;" This Rule was
clearly not complied with. For these reasons, the plea was not knowing, and
the trial court should have allowed Defendant to withdraw it.
It was apparent during the plea colloquy that Defendant was not
admitting guilt. When he was asked how he pled to being in possession of a
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, he answered, "Alford?"
62/10).
His attorney then responded, "It is guilty as proffered." (R. 62/10)
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(R.

Defendant then said, "Oh. Guilty as proffered." (R. 62/10)
When the Defendant entered his pleas to the next two charges, he also
answered, "Guilty as proffered."

(R. 62/10).

The court then asked the

Defendant if he understood what an Alford plea was. He answered, "It's that
I'm pleading guilty so my other charges doesn't get charged against me." (R.
62/11).
The court asked the Defendant if he believed that it was in his best
interests to accept the plea. He answered, "Yes, sir." (R. 62/11).
The court also asked the Defendant if he felt like if he went to trial there
was a good likelihood that he would be convicted. The Defendant's attorney
answered for him. He said "They're just (unintelligible) you'd be convicted
because of the circumstantial evidence of the case and the direct evidence so
you're pleading guilty to avoid the other charges." (R. 62/11-12). Even though
the Defendant was asked if he felt like there was a strong possibility that he
would be convicted he was not given the opportunity to answer the question.
When the record as a whole is examined in its entirety, it is clear that the
factual basis was insufficient to show that the State's case was strong enough
to warrant acceptance of the plea where guilt was not admitted. In Henderson
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 9 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), the Supreme
Court stated that "clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it
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constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the
defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the
first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" Id. at 645.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d
274 (1969), the Supreme Court stated, "[w]hat is at stake for an accused facing
[punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a foil
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." Id. at 24344.
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated that since "[t]he
entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important constitutional
rights" and "because the prosecution will generally be unable to show that it
will suffer and significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted."
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Utah 1987), See also, State v. Ruiz,
2008 UT App 470 Tf 11. The Defendant's plea was not knowingly entered
where he entered an Alford plea, and an adequate factual basis was not entered
on the record. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court
to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

15

CONCLUSION
Defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as constitutional due process
require a sufficient factual basis to ensure that a criminal defendant
understands the nature of the charges and the weight of the evidence against
him. In the case at bar, the factual basis was insufficient to show that there was
substantial risk that Defendant would be convicted if he went to trial. For these
reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
DATED this ^ d a y of May 2009.

RANDALL W. RICH
Attorney for Appellant
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN.^r
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OELUiaHflEi\j

f^

^ v w

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 071902173 FS

DAVID CALDERON,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

4U:.
-^

ERNIE W JONES
July 30, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GALLEGOS, RICHARD M
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 16, 1989
Video
Tape Number:
4C 073008
Tape Count: 2.40-2:47
CHARGES
1. ARSON Plea:
2. THEFT Plea:

3rd Degree Felony
Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/08 Guilty
2nd Degree Felony
Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/08 Guilty

HEARING
COUNT: 2:40
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and
represented by Attorney Richard Gallegos. Attorney Brandon Miles
is present representing the State of Utah. Counsel address the
Court, and sentencing proceeds.
Sentence J u d a m ^ n t , n ^ n

pages

™*W*

Page 1

CALDERON.DAVID
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Case No: 071902173
Date:
Jul 30, 2008
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years m the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The defendant is authorized work release but is denied good time
credit.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence m this case shall run concurrently with the sentence
imposed m case number 071901957.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.

Page 2

Case No: 071902173
Date:
Jul 30, 2008

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its
terms and conditions.
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or
municipal.
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary by Adult Probation &
Parole, paying all costs.
The defendant shall not consume any alcohol or illegal drugs.
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment.
The defendant shall obtain a GED or high school diploma.
The defendant shall have no association with any known gang member
or be involved m any gang activity.
The defendant shall successfully complete a theft counseling
program under the direction of Adult Probation & Parole, paying all
costs.
The defendant shall successfully complete tne Thinking for a Cnange
program through Adult Probation & Parole or some other type of
cognitive restructuring program, paying all costs
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult
Probation Sc Parole, and pay all costs.
The defendant shall abide by a 7.00 p.m. curfew for the first 90
days after release from jail, which may be modified by Adult
Probation & Parole.
The defendant shall submit to warrantless search, seizure and
chemical testing.
The defendant shall not wear gang attire or possess gang
paraphernalia.
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Case No: 071902173
Date:
Jul 30, 2008
Dated this

"( day of

—/ CJL n

2 0 0 ,) .

f

ERNIE W JONES
\
District Court Judge
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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WEBER COUNT/, STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
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IN SUPPORT OF GUILD PLEA

Plaintiff,
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Case No
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Defendant
<^/^

, hereby acknowledge and certify that

have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights,

NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes
CRIME &> STATUTORY
PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR

r

^Z.

J.

S O r->

C

£2,

/

D

Statement of Defendant »n Suppo?1 of Guilty Plea and <

071302173

CD28450809
CALDERON,DAVID

paqes 7

Mo ,000;

.S79CA7^V

I have feceiv/ed a copy of the (Amended) Inrotmatiot asainst mc I nave read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the natuie and the elements of the cnme(s; to which I am pleadins
guilty Coi no contest)
The elements of th^ cnme(s) to which I am pleading g! iilty Cor no contest) ate

^LJL_.

J-gX^

CJ^__

(Jo

,

A

^Q-^X j
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c> j r fe_ ^ s d CJLGJIXJ.*
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I undersiana that b> pleadins suiity I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the (oiegoing
cnmes) I stipulate and agiee (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest, tnat
the following fa^ts descibe my conduct and the conduct oi other persons fo1 vvhicn i am
criminally liable These facts piovide a basis ror the Couit to accept my guilty (or no contest;
pleas and piove the elements o( the cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty (01 no contest)

M

f\

/ ., I,. '/
Yt^^z—ns-TrveV

r~~)

WAIv/EP Of CONSTITUTIONAl RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily I understand that I have tne following rights under ihe
constitutions of Utah and the United States I also undet stand that if I plead guilty Cor no contest)
I will give up all the following rights

<6r^

COUNSEL

I knov\ thai' have the ngh+ to be »epiesented by an attorney ano that i f i cannot

afioicl one an attome> wii! be appointed by the Courc at no cost to me I understand that I
might later, if the Judge determined tnat I was aolc, be required to pay foi the appointed
lawyer's service to me
ha/e not waived my iight to_cojnsel) If 1 have waived my fight to counsel, I have done
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the follo/ving icason

If! have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have lead this statement and that I
understand the natute and elements of the chaiges and etimes 10 which I am pleading guilt) (or
no contest) I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)

^

*)

\

If I have /7of waived my right to counsel, my attorne/ is j ^ l c J

\,
v^X. v

Z^
LH

My attorney and I have fully discussed th»s statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilt/ (or no contest) plea(s)
JURYTRKL

I know that I have a right to a speed\ and public trial by an impartial (unbiased)

jury and that I will oe giving up that right by pleading guihy (or no contest)
CONFROI NATION AI JD CROSS-EXAMINATION

of WITNESSES I know that ir I were to have d jury

tna!, (a) I would have the light to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
(b) by my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me
RIGHT I O COMPEL WITNESSES

I know that if I were to have a jury tnal, I could call witnesses if I

choose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas reouinng the attendance and testimony of
the witnesses If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay
those costs
RIGHT TO TESTIS

N-r PpMiiGr AGMNST SELF-IN:PI/AINMION I know that if I were to have a jury

trial, I woulo have the right to testif/ on m/ own behalf I also know that if I choose not to testify,
no one could make me testif/ or make me give evder.ee agans4 m/self I also know tha* if i
choose no- to testify, the jur> woulo be told tna> the/ coulo not hold m/ refusal to testif> against
«'ie

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF

I know that if I do not plead guilty (or no

contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged cnme(s). If
I choose to fight the charges against me, ! need only plead "not guilty" and my case will be set
for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s)
beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning
that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
APPEAL.

I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, !

would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

CONSEQUENCES or ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
POTENTIAL PENALTIES.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime

to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) 10 a
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandator/ penalty
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that dre dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS.

I know that if there is more than one crime involved,

the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run at the same
time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no

''6 7

contest) pleafs; now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, ' know the law
requites the cou^t to impose consecutive sentences unless the Courr finds and states on the
recoid that consecutive sentences would be inappiopnate
PLL> BARGAIN

My guilty for no contest) plea(s) (is/are not; the result of a plea bargain

oetween myself and the piosecutmg attorney All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, die fully contained in this statement, including those explained below

&^_ r*^

z£j> jJ-jfTZTr,
^awozn-g^
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^^^^^^—•<—^>x-^

:

TRIAL JUDCp? NOT BOUND

I mow that any charge oi sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation oi suspended sentence, including a i eduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel oi the prosecuting attorney aie not
binding on the Judge I also know that any opinions the/ express to me as to what the/ believe
the Judge ma/ do are not binding on the Judge

DEFENDANT'S CEPTIHCATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice No force, threats oi unlawful
influence of an/ kind have been made to get me to plead guilt) (oi no contest) No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me
I have read th's statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand
its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own I know that I am free to change or delete
an/thing contained in this statement, but! do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements aie correct

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney ,
I am (_£>_ years of age I have attended school througj/the l(^^3\&de

I can read

and undo*stand the English Language If I do not understand i'^lish^H-iTiteipiete! has been
provided to me I was not undei the influence of any drugs medication or intoxicants which
would impaii my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am no j presentl/ undei the
influence of any drug, medications or intoxicants which impair m/judgement
I believe m/self to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentallv capable of
understandino tl iese proceedings and the conseouences of my plea I am free of any mental
disease, aefea, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing oy
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) pleat's), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing I will be allowed to withdraw my
plea only if I ^how good cause Once I am sentenced, I lose my right to withdraw my plea
DAI to this J b

day of

IK^o^—czJ^—
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DEFENDANT

CERTIF£AfE-er-DEFENSr ATTORNEY ^

I certify that I am the attome/ for \^^6L0

C^CK (^L^JKX^L^

<?^ , the defendant

above and that I know he/she has read the statement or that' have read it to him/her, I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and <s mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge ana belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the cnme(s) and the factual synopsis-of the
™

^

defendant s criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, alonqy^n the otfieT
representations and declarations made by the defendant injleffor^enri^a^idavit/^re §£clirate
and true

v C0f< DEFENDANT
BAR N o /
/

-^^TORNF

iR Q

CERTIFICATE OF PROSEC JTINC A T T O R N

^
I

ucertify that I am tne attorne/ fof the State of Utah in the case against
CxJ^oUL-

{/r^\j

( 6^

f~c^ d e f e n d a n t I nave reviewed this statement of defendant and find that the

factual basis or the defendant's cnminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct No improper inducements, threats, 01 coercion to encourage a plea has been offeied
defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attacned Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record befoie the Court There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offensefs) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest

PROSECUTING ATTORNE/

BAR NO

QSO&.

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and tne certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly and
voluntary made
It is hereby ordered that the defendant s guilt/ for no contest) plea(s) to the enme(sj set
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered
Dated this ZL? day of

^ L t L , c- ciA^^

Z0&&>

DisTRiertbuPT JUDGE
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defendant was in -- in possession of tne 199^ Honda Accord
wnich had been reported stolen by Foster Auto.

He was

arrested for chat charge and the automobile was impounded to
All Hours Towing since the defendant was arrested while he
was driving it.
Later that day or into the night the defendant made
bail, went over with the assistance of some other people, got
into All Hours Towing impound yard, drove the car through a
fence, took it out in a field and burned it.
THE COURT:
MR. DAINES:

Ail right.
In 1957, the defendant was stopped in

an automobile that was stolen.

He gave two or three

different stories that -~ as to where he got the car and also
gave the officers a registration to a different Honda than
the one that he was driving -- these were all Hondas -- than
the one tnat he was driving.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

the other case, case ending m

And Mr. Calderon, on

2173, Count 1 is arson and

that's a third degree felony, that carries the potential of
up to five years in prison and a $5,000 fine.

And the

allegation is that between August the 8th and August the 9th
of 2007, you unlawfully and intentionally damaged the
property of Fester Auto or All Hours Towing by means of fire
or explosives and the damaged caused is or exceeds a thousand
dollars but was less than 5,000.
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